DISARMAMENT

Newsletter

Newsletter of the
World Disarmament Campaign
Volume 9, Number 5
October 1991

United Nations

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The cover photograph shows a B-1 bomber. START attributes only one bomb to each plane.

Information published by the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs may be requested from the World Disarmament Campaign, DDA, Room S-3100, United Nations, New York, N.Y. 10017, USA; or from the Geneva Branch, DDA, Palais des Nations, CH-1211, Geneva 10, Switzerland; the Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean, Mcal. Blas Cerdeña 450, San Isidro, Lima, Perú or the Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, P.O. Box 107 Pulchowk, Kathmandu, Nepal.

Disarmament Newsletter
October 1991 – Vol.9 No.5
The Disarmament Newsletter is published bi-monthly by the United Nations

Closing United States military bases in the USA and Europe

On 30 July the United States Congress gave its support to a plan to close 25 major military installations and nine smaller ones with a vote in the House of Representative of 364 to 60. The plan to make these reductions had been prepared by a Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission. The Commission members had been appointed by President George Bush with the approval of the Senate in 1988. It was decided that Congress would have to either approve the entire recommendation of the Commission or reject it, but would not be able to modify its recommendations.

In addition to providing for the closure of 34 bases in the United States, implementation of the plan will lead to the consolidation of another 48 bases and is expected to eliminate some 80,000 military and 37,000 civilian jobs.

According to a US Department of Defense study released this spring, a loss of military and military-base-related jobs can be more than counterbalanced by new civilian jobs created through the redevelopment of the sites on which a base stood. In examining the effects on employment of the closing of 100 bases since 1960, it was found that 158,000 new jobs were created at those base locations which was well above the 93,000 positions lost when the installations were shut down. Many of these bases were converted into airports or industrial and office parks, and some were redeveloped as vocational schools.

Although the total cost of the base closings is estimated at $4.1 billion or $ 820 million per year during the five years, 1992 to 1997, allowed for completing the closings, the annual savings after that will be about $1.5 billion per year.

The 1991 base closing process has been described as the most ambitious since the end of World War II. It is meant to bring United States military facilities into line with planned reductions of 521,000 men and women from the armed services over the next five years. United States troop levels are to decline by 25%, to 1.6 million, while projections indicate that defence spending as a percentage of the US federal budget will decrease from its present level of 26% to 18% over the same five-year period.

When the House of Representatives approved the base closure proposal, it also supported a further proposal that would give the Commission new powers regarding the closing of US bases overseas.

Also regarding closing US bases overseas, the Department of Defense announced on 30 July that it will close 72 military bases in Europe by 1995 and reduce the number of troops at seven others. These bases range from a major military airport in Berlin to barracks and ammunition depots. They consist of 38 sites in Germany, 13 in the UK, 8 in Italy, 7 in Turkey, 5 in Spain and one in the Netherlands. □

Entrance to the Naval Air Station scheduled for closing at Moffett Field, Sunnyvale, California.

START

On 31 July, US President George Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev signed the START accord at the Moscow summit. Under START, the number of long-range nuclear weapons with a range of more than 5,000 kilometres (about 3,000 miles) will be reduced significantly.

As shown on the table to the right, the number of warheads on land-based and submarine-launched intercontinental ballistic missiles will be cut by roughly 48% for the Soviet Union and by roughly 35% for the United States. Each side may have no more than 4,900 warheads deployed on these two classes of delivery vehicles.

At the same time the Treaty does not prevent the number of warheads deployed on bombers and on air-borne short-range attack missiles from rising, nor does it reduce the number on air-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles.

There is a ceiling of 6,000 accountable warheads for all classes of strategic weapons covered by START. These consist of the number of warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, the number of long-range, nuclear-armed air-launched cruise missiles attributed to heavy bombers and one warhead attributed to each heavy bomber equipped only for nuclear-armed gravity bombs and short-range attack missiles. Since more than this number of warheads can be deployed per delivery vehicle, the total number of warheads possible under the Treaty is greater than the number of accountable warheads. However, even taking account of this fact, the overall number of strategic-weapon warheads will decrease, as is shown by the large table below.

Of the total of 4,900 warheads allowed each side on ballistic missiles (ICBMs and SLBMs), no more than 1,100 are allowed on land-based mobile missiles, and no more than 1,540 on 154 heavy Soviet ICBMs (SS-18s) which will be eliminated at the rate of 22 per year over seven years to reach the agreed limit.

A ceiling of 1,600 has been set for each party on the total number of deployed strategic missile delivery vehicles in silos, on submarines and on heavy bombers.

The Treaty provides for a verification regime which will include data exchanges, on-site inspections to establish a baseline inventory and for the conversion and elimination of weapons systems. Short-notice inspections are also permitted at facilities related to strategic offensive arms, including inspections to verify the numbers of re-entry vehicles on deployed ballistic missiles. Challenge inspections of "suspect sites" are also permitted.

The reductions specified by the Treaty are to take place within seven years of ratification and the Treaty will have a duration of 15 years which can be extended for successive five-year periods, unless superseded earlier by a subsequent agreement.□

ICBMs & SLBMs

	Soviet Union	United States
Current Level	9,405	7,506
After Treaty	4,900	4,900
Change	-48%	-35%

Source: Arms Control Association

Limits on warheads under START on

	Long-range ballistic missiles				Bombs & SRAMs & cruise missiles				All warheads	
	USSR		USA		USSR		USA		USSR	USA
	ICBMs	SLBMs	ICBMs	SLBMs	Bombs SRAMs	ALCMs SLCMs	Bombs SRAMs	ALCMs SLCMs	TOTAL	TOTAL
Current Levels	6,595	2,810	2,450	5,056	636	780	2,608	1,967	10,821	12,081
After Treaty	3,028	1,872	1,444	3,456	960	2,180	2,720	2,740	8,040	10,360
Change	**-54%**	**-33%**	**-41%**	**-32%**	**+51%**	**+179%**	**+4%**	**+39%**	**-26%**	**-14%**

ICMBs: Inter-continental Ballistic Missles
SLBMs: Submarine-launched Ballistic Missiles

SRAMs: Short-Range Air-launched Missiles
ALCMs: Air-Launched Cruise Missiles
SLCMs: Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles

Source: Arms Control Association

READEX FICHE

The Secretary-General reports on the work of the Organization

An excerpt from the Report of the Secretary-General follows:

"Another principal source of chronic instability is the militarization of human society represented by the level of armaments and military outlays in the world today. The unconscionable waste of resources and energies is only one of its results. Equally deleterious is the obsession with military security which has corroded international relations and hampered the advance of most developing countries towards stable democratic institutions. The obsession has been as ruinous in political, cultural and psychological terms as it has been financially costly.

Over the years, however, the cold war overshadowed the whole field of arms limitation and disarmament. The perspectives that have now been opened should enable us to weave collective approaches in this field more tightly into the fabric of peace-making and conflict control. The opportunities now presented to us are not likely to remain open indefinitely.

At the global level, the priorities include a search for new, stabilizing reductions in nuclear weapons, maintaining the regained momentum of support for uncontrolled proliferation of advanced weapons of mass destruction and the relevant technology, a swift conclusion of a convention for the comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons and strengthening the basic obligations of the Biological Weapons Convention. The challenge that is to be overcome to achieve non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is that of devising applications and above all reliably detect non-compliance, wherever and whenever it occurs.

Assuring orderly flows of badly needed technology to developing countries, without leading to weapons proliferation, is an issue of great importance. What is needed is a formula for cooperation involving greater willingness by the industrial countries to meet the needs of developing countries for science and technology for peaceful purposes, coupled with genuine openness among recipients about their end-use.

For several years, I have expressed grave concern over the problem of excessive and destabilizing transfers of conventional armaments. Recent expressions of support for the idea of promoting transparency in the arms trade through a United Nations-based scheme for registration and disclosure are encouraging. If applied fairly to, and worked out in concert by, arms suppliers and recipients alike, a register would foster a climate that is conducive to voluntary restraint and more responsible behaviour. Over the longer term, we must seek to develop fair criteria for multilateral control of arms transfers while at the same time meeting the legitimate security needs of States.

Dismantling the military edifice of the cold war should mean designing a credible architecture for regional security. In this connection, one cannot disregard the existing imbalances and asymmetries within regions that cause recurrent tensions and insecurity. This again shows how difficult it is to detach arms limitation negotiations from the peaceful settlement of international disputes. For its part, the Secretariat has given high priority to organizing regional and inter-regional meetings as a way to explore solutions tailored to the distinctive needs of regions and sub-regions. But only when this dialogue engages the policy makers of States will our aim be realized. The mist of unreality that has hung over discussions of limiting and reducing the level of arms needs to be blown away. That, I believe, is a most impelling call of the present moment in history".□

Potrait of Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar (UN Photo J. Isaac)

Secretary-General's message to IAEA

Extending greetings to the participants at the 35th regular session of the General Conference of IAEA, Mr. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar drew attention to the need to find effective means to halt the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.

He said that "the violations by Iraq of its safeguards agreement with IAEA, and of its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty," had given prominence to the fundamental importance of ensuring a safeguards system in which States could have full confidence.

The role of IAEA in building and maintaining a credible level of confidence was crucial, he stated. "The role of the Agency in promoting safety and sound management in the peaceful application of nuclear technologies has been fully recognized. The challenge now is to devise improved measures of verification which will build confidence and allay fears, safeguard peaceful applications and above all reliably detect non-compli- ance, wherever and whenever it occurs. This challenge must be met with vigour and with the necessary resources".□

CSCE holds meeting in Moscow

Thirty-eight States participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe met in Moscow from 10 to 12 September in a major CSCE Conference concerning human rights.

In a keynote address on the opening day of the Conference, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev stressed the importance of worldwide demilitarization. "In the current era of change there were new opportunities for success".

US Secretary of State James A. Baker urged support for democracy, the rule of law and peaceful change through orderly democratic processes.

Noting that CSCE has no divisions of tanks, he said that its moral authority flowed from the principles of the Helsinki final Act and the Charter of Paris.

Following the admission of the three Baltic States on 10 September, CSCE now consists of: Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, USSR, United Kingdom, United States and Yugoslavia.□

South Africa and IAEA sign full-scope agreement

On 16 September 1991 prior to the 35th regular session of the General Conference of IAEA, South Africa signed a full-scope safeguards agreement with IAEA.□

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Disarmament Newsletter*
Volume 9, Nos. 1-5, 1991
Published six times per year.

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CW convention up-date

In 1991 the negotiations on the chemical weapons convention at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament have seen a qualitative change. The draft Convention presented to the Conference at the close of its 1991 session contains a significant number of new provisions reflecting the progress achieved during the year.

The negotiations have now entered into their final stage. This fact is evidenced by a change in the mandate of the Conference *Ad Hoc* Committee on Chemical Weapons. It now, for the first time since the negotiations began, sets a time limit – 1992 – for conclusion.

Negotiations intensified significantly following an initiative of the United States in May. Withdrawing from previously held positions, the United States made a commitment to unconditionally destroy all of its chemical weapons stockpiles and chemical weapons production facilities within the agreed ten-year destruction period, a commitment which was also made by the USSR.

Furthermore, the United States expressed its readiness to formally foreswear the use of chemical weapons under any circumstances, including retaliation. With this new approach major obstacles were removed.

The *Ad Hoc* Committee was thus able to agree on the expansion of the scope of the future convention to include such a fundamental obligation as the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons under any circumstances and against anyone, including against States not party to the convention.

The draft convention now also includes a provision on the unconditional and total destruction of chemical weapons and their production facilities within 10 years after its entry into force.

Further progress in terms of agreed text relates to an article which provides for both voluntary and to a certain extent automatic assistance to a party in case of use or threat of use of chemical weapons against it.

There was also progress regarding text concerning the article on the relationship between the draft convention and other international agreements. This stipulates that nothing in the convention shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed by any State party under the 1925 Geneva Protocol or under the 1972 biological weapons Convention.

Some progress was also registered with regard to provisions relating to economic and technical cooperation, to measures to ensure compliance and to redress situations of non-compliance, including sanctions, and on the settlement of disputes, although more work is needed in order to reach final agreement on them.

In spite of intensive negotiations, some key issues remain unsolved, such as the question of verification of compliance with the provisions of the convention which includes the verification regime to be established for the civilian chemical industry and the whole issue of challenge inspections.

A number of proposals were submitted to stimulate and advance the negotiations, especially on the subject of challenge inspections. The most recent came in July from Australia, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Another unresolved issue is the question of the size, the composition and decision-making process of the Executive Council, one of the bodies of the Organization to be established to implement the convention.

Soviet Ambassador Serguei B. Batsanov, Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Committee, stressed that the considerable progress achieved was due to the efforts of all the participants in the negotiations. This includes the 39 States that are members of the Conference on Disarmament as well as 37 States that are not members which have taken part in the work.

Nonetheless a great deal remains to be done in order to complete the work on the convention next year. It was therefore agreed that the *Ad Hoc* Committee would continue its work by holding additional sessions during the periods 30 September 1991 to 11 October, 18 November to 20 December and 6 to 17 January 1992, i.e. before the regular 1992 session. A meeting with experts on technical aspects of the destruction of chemical weapons will also be held from 7 to 11 October.□

Technical aspects of CW verification

In July, Finland presented the Conference on Disarmament with the latest volume of its Blue-Book series on verification of chemical disarmament entitled "International Interlaboratory Comparison Test for the Verification of Chemical Disarmament; Testing of Procedures on Simulated Industry Samples". The Blue Books contain detailed scientific information on over 200 chemical warfare agents and the precursor chemicals used to manufacture them.

The most recent Blue Book provides results of tests conducted by laboratories in 15 countries: Australia, Canada, China, Czechoslovakia, Finland, France, Germany, India, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the USSR, the UK and the United States. The objective was to test and further develop procedures for sample preparation and analysis to determine their effectiveness in the verification of the future chemical weapons convention which is being negotiated at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

When the chemical weapons convention comes into force, verification procedures will be required for three main purposes:

- to confirm that all existing stocks of chemical weapons and material for their production are destroyed;
- to verify the non-production of new weapons and components;
- to verify any claim that chemical weapons might have been used.

Techniques for these verification objectives have been developed through detailed research in several countries to find methods for identifying chemical warfare agents and to train chemists to use the methods developed.

Samples of chemical material being collected in Iraq some of which is being sent to Finland for analysis.

The Finnish Research Project on the Verification of Chemical Disarmament was started in 1973. Initially it focused on the chemistry of the most lethal chemical warfare agents, the nerve agents which contain phosphorus. The researchers synthesized these agents in small amounts to develop methods for analysis. Later, non-phosphorus agents such as mustard gas were also studied.

The Project developed analytical techniques and equipment, including the Micromat 412, a precision gas chromatograph controlled by a microprocessor, which reveals a unique chemical signature or "fingerprint" for each chemical warfare agent. These unique signatures, called retention indexes, have been tested in mobile field laboratories of the Finnish Defence Forces and used in customs and environmental laboratories. They are now stored in a computerized library in the project's laboratory at the University of Helsinki where the identification data can be compared with environmental samples.

After developing an analytical method for identifying the exact chemical "fingerprints" of the compounds, the research moved out of the laboratory to collect samples and test instruments in the field. It focused on drawing up standard laboratory techniques and created a computerized database to be used as a reference baseline for identifying chemical warfare agents.

When a chemical weapons convention comes into force, the production and use of a number of chemicals will come under international control, but new technology could lead to the synthesis of new agents. Therefore, laboratories are seeking ways to map the chemical structure of unknown chemicals. Although this is difficult, especially when these chemicals are mixed in with environmental samples, field tests have helped Project researchers develop a battery of

procedures that can be used to identify unknown chemical agents.

Air monitoring methods have also been developed to detect chemicals released into the atmosphere. The fact that even a few kilograms of a chemical warfare agent can be detected hundreds of kilometres downwind is expected to have a powerful deterrent effect on would-be violators of the convention. Field tests show that chemical simulants can be detected as far as 200 km away from the release site even when there are only very small quantities released.

The monitoring of non-production of banned chemical warfare agents will involve the application of a number of the techniques developed. On-site monitoring has been tested by examining samples obtained from wiping the surface of processing equipment, from collecting samples of chemical wastes and collecting air samples from a warehouse.

The 15-country inter-laboratory comparison tests reported in the most recent Blue Book demonstrated the importance of reference benchmark data. The tests also showed the need for proper sampling methods, a means for stabilizing samples and for rapid transportation of samples to laboratories.

The international programme coordinated by the Finnish Verification Project is now compiling detailed instructions on the steps in the verification process with an emphasis on standardizing the recording of information. The aim is that anyone responsible for verifying a chemical weapons convention should be able to carry out identical analyses of suspect compounds and obtain identical results.□

Short-range nuclear weapons

The NATO Nuclear Planning Group scheduled to meet in November will consider the possibility of negotiations on their air- and naval-based short-range nuclear forces (SNF). In the meantime, plans are being made to remove all ground-based tactical nuclear weapons from Europe, with or without formal agreement. Soviet tactical nuclear weapons are already being removed from former Warsaw-Treaty countries.

The Soviet Union has called for the complete elimination of SNF since 1987. US Defense Secretary Dick Cheney stated recently that he saw a good chance that NATO would agree to open negotiations on the subject.

The short-range systems and nuclear artillery did not have much meaning in Europe now that Germany was united and the Warsaw Pact was desolved and Soviet troops were leaving Eastern Europe, he said in a presentation to the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Secretary Cheney also stated that even if no new arms agreements were reached, the three that had been concluded in the past four years had made it safe to make further reductions.

These were the INF intermediate-range nuclear forces Treaty of December 1987, the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty of November 1990, and the START Treaty of 1991 for the reduction of intercontinental strategic nuclear forces.

The short-range nuclear forces category includes air-, sea- and land-based nuclear weapons of either tactical (150-500 kilometres) or battlefield (0-150 kilometres) range.



A nuclear-capable short-range Lance missile.

In 1990 it was estimated that the United States arsenal included 1,670 nuclear artillery shells, 692 Lance missiles, 192 B-57 nuclear depth bombs and 1,740 free-fall bombs, while the Soviet Union had 510 SCUD-B missiles, 600 FROG missiles and 289 SS-21 missiles.

Political changes in Europe have focused new attention on the question of negotiations on short-range nuclear forces. At its July 1990 summit in London, NATO acknowledged that it needed far fewer nuclear weapons. Particularly it said it would not need "systems of the shortest range."

At the December 1990 meetings of NATO, the United States and the United Kingdom removed earlier objections to immediate negotiations towards an SNF ban on all ground-based missile systems with ranges less than 500 kilometres. At the same meeting, while NATO reaffirmed its policy of keeping some nuclear forces in Europe, it also announced that it would begin to prepare for negotiations on the reduction of short-range nuclear forces.□

Nuclear weapons in the Soviet Republics

Meeting in Moscow from 2 to 5 September, the Congress of Peoples' Deputies endorsed the proposal of President Gorbachev and the Presidents of 9 Republics to maintain a single military defence system and to ensure that all nuclear weapons are under central control. Most Soviet nuclear weapons are located in the Russian Republic with some 1,000 in Kazakhstan and 1,000 in Ukraine. Approximately 10% to 15% of Soviet fixed-silo nuclear missiles are located in Kazakhstan.

The Parliaments of Byelorussia and Ukraine had both declared their territories nuclear-weapon-free zones prior to the changes in governmental structures that took place in August and September 1991. The Ukrainian Parliament adopted three non-nuclear principles in its Declaration of State Sovereignty of 16 July 1990: not to use nuclear weapons, not to produce them and not to permit their deployment or storage on their territory. In a press conference at the United Nations on 28 August, Ambassador Guennadi I. Oudevenko of Ukraine said the last point would have to be negotiated with the central Soviet government. On August 29, Mr Leonid M. Kravchuk, Chairman of the Ukrainian Parliament, stated that he would be happy to have the nuclear weapons which were on Ukrainian territory moved to the Russian Republic.

President Gorbachev stated on 5 September that the system of control on Soviet missiles was different from that used by the United States, but was at least as safe. "We cannot reveal to you the mechanism, but I can at the same time assure you that this is a very rigid mechanism which excludes the possibility of any surprises", he added.

Senior military commanders in the Soviet Union have also asserted that their nuclear arsenal poses no danger. On 1 September the new Soviet Defence Minister, Yevgeny Shaposhikov assured the Chairman of the US Senate Armed Services Committee that Soviet nuclear weapons would remain under central government control. In an interview on 5 September he again stated that "nuclear weapons are under secure control".

Different generations of Soviet weapons have different types of safety systems to prevent the missiles from being armed with warheads without authorization. The security systems on short-range tactical weapons are less foolproof than those for strategic weapons, and some of the oldest may not have double locking systems. Nonetheless the missiles and the warheads are held separately with a special military chain of command for combining them. Soviet experts stress that the sites where such weapons are kept are themselves very secure against theft or terrorism. Tactical short-range weapons are located at a wide range of sites in Byelorussia, Kazakhstan, the Russian Republic and Ukraine. □

Semipalatinsk

On 30 August the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, issued a decree closing the major Soviet nuclear weapons testing range at Semipalatinsk. The decree said that more than 500 nuclear weapons tests had been conducted there since 1949. In 1989 the tests were stopped due to public pressure and concern about the health effects and the main test site was moved to the Novay Zemlya region in the Russian Arctic.□

China decides to accede to NPT

On 10 August, during a summit meeting between Prime Minister Li Peng of China and Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu of Japan, China announced that it had decided in principle to accede to the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty of 1968.

With China as a party all five declared nuclear-weapon States will have become parties to the NPT. France announced that it would do so on 3 June of this year, and the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States are the depositary States parties and were among the original signatories on 1 July 1968.

China has in the past been critical of the NPT for being discriminatory by creating two groups of parties: those that are permitted by the Treaty to have nuclear weapons, and those that may not have nuclear weapons. It has nonetheless stated that it does not encourage nuclear proliferation.

However it has been reported from time to time that China has exported sensitive nuclear material and technology to some countries that are considered to be threshold nuclear weapons States with the capacity or near capacity to produce nuclear weapons.□

Soviet brigade to leave Cuba

Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev stated that the Soviet Union intends to withdraw a training brigade of Soviet personnel from Cuba. Some 11,000 military personnel is said to be involved in the withdrawal. The decision was made known in discussions between Soviet President Gorbachev and US Secretary of State James A. Baker on 11 September.□

Alfonso García Robles, 1911-1991

Ambassador Alfonso García Robles, often referred to as "the father of the Treaty of Tlatelolco" died on 2 September in Mexico City.

As Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs of Mexico from 1964 to 1971, he became one of the most active voices for the denuclearization of Latin America. His work led to the completion for signature of the Treaty of Tlatelolco on 14 February 1967. It was the first treaty to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in a populated region.

From November 1975 through December 1976 he was the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Mexico. In 1982 he received the Nobel Peace Prize together with Alva Myrdal of Sweden. His award was given in recognition of the leadership he provided preparing the Treaty of Tlatelolco and for his work as one of the main drafters of the Final Document of the 1978 special session on Disarmament.

Earlier in the year that he received the Nobel Peace Prize, Ambassador García Robles was one of the leading diplomats responsible for the preparation of the Concluding Document of the second special session on Disarmament which launched the United Nations World Disarmament Campaign with the objective of educating and generating public understanding and support for the objectives of the United Nations in the field of arms limitation and disarmament.

In a message of condolence Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar said the late Ambassador was a man of remarkable erudition and great personal qualities who devoted his extraordinary energy and knowledge to the cause of disarmament, collective security and peace.□

Declaration of Guadalajara

The Heads of State and Government of twenty-one States took part in the first Ibero-American Summit held at Guadalajara, Mexico on 18 and 19 July to consider jointly the major challenges facing their countries in a changing world.

Proposing a new culture of international cooperation as the only path to a just and stable world, they decided to establish the Ibero-American Conference of Heads of State and Government consisting of the Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking sovereign States of America and Europe which would meet in Spain in 1992, in Brazil in 1993, in Colombia in 1994 and in Argentina in 1995 to enable them to embark on a political, economic and cultural process which would help their countries achieve greater and more efficient integration in a changing global context. □

Rio Group invited to Lima

The Government of Peru has invited the Foreign Ministers of the Rio Group to attend a special meeting on regional disarmament in Latin America.

On the occasion of the first Ibero-American Summit held at Guadalajara, Mexico in July, President Alberto Fujimori of Peru proposed developing a regional disarmament policy based on arms limitation and on the use of the resources thus released to promote the region's economic and social development. This should be done, he said, in the framework of a new concept of defence aimed at preserving the stability of legitimately constituted Governments in the face of internal threats such as drug trafficking and terrorism which had assumed regional dimensions.

The purpose of the meeting would be to reach agreement on jointly renouncing all kinds of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.

It is also proposed that the participating States should agree to prohibit the future purchase, transfer and manufacture of new generations of advanced conventional weapons systems, principally medium- and short-range ballistic missiles, fuel air explosives, laser-guided bombs and munitions, multiple launch rocket systems, anti-radar missiles and mini-conductors, nuclear-powered submarines and Stealth technologies.

It is further envisaged that the meeting should seek to reach agreement on security, confidence-building and transparency measures between the democracies of the Rio Group countries, such as increased contacts between military high commands, reduced levels of troops and offensive weapons in border areas, reciprocal notification of military manoeuvres, invitations to observe military manoeuvres, visits to military installations and the creation of a centre for the registration of arms transfers and arms production in those countries.

The Rio Group which was established in December 1986 as a "permanent mechanism of consultation and political coordination" now consists of eleven States: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.□

Declaration of Mendoza

On 5 September, Argentina, Brazil and Chile signed a joint declaration on banning the production and storage of chemical and biological weapons on their territories. The signing by the foreign ministers of the three countries took place in the Andean mountain city of Mendoza in Argentina.

The signatory States declared:

- Their full commitment not to develop, produce, acquire, stockpile or retain, transfer directly or indirectly, or to use chemical or biological weapons;

- That they will jointly study the necessary mechanisms to insure this commitment until the future global convention on chemical weapons now being negotiated in Geneva enters into force;

- Their intention to establish in each country the appropriate monitoring mechanisms on those substances defined as agents of chemical war until that convention enters into force;

- Their wish to cooperate closely to facilitate the conclusion of the global convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons and their determination ot sign it simultaneously as original parties to it;

- Their reaffirmation of the right to all peaceful applications of chemistry and biology for economic and technological development for the wellbeing of their peoples;

- Their conviction that the implementation of the global convention will create a framework of confidence among States allowing for a substantial increase in international cooperation in the exchange of chemical substances, equipment and related technologies;

- Their wish to contribute to the success of the Third Review Conference of the Convention on the Prohibition of Biological Weapons and to its mandate to examine ways to improve its verification measures.

In a message of the Secretary-General on the occasion of the signing of the Declaration of Mendoza, Mr. Javier Péres de Cuéllar extended congratulations to the three governments. He said that together with the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the Mendoza Declaration would contribute to keeping Latin America and the Carribbean free from weapons of mass destruction and would serve as an important measure of confidence-building among States in the region. It would also, he stated, afford a valuable impetus to the ongoing negotiations in Geneva to reach an early conclusion on a comprehensive global ban on chemical weapons.□

Chile supports Foz do Iguaçú Declaration

The Declaration of Foz do Iguaçú signed last November by Presidents Carlos Menem of Argentina and Fernando Collor de Mello of Brazil has now attracted the attention of President Patricio Aylwin of Chile. In the process of preparing the Declaration of Mendoza at the beginning of September 1991, on the renunciation of chemical and biological weapons, he said his country would be interested in also supporting the Declaration of Foz do Iguaçú.

On 28 November 1990, Argentina and Brazil had formally renounced the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear weapons in signing the Declaration of Foz do Iguaçú. This commitment had been preceded by visits of the two Presidents with technical experts of their two countries to each other's nuclear facilities, including uranium enrichment plants at Pilcaniyeu and Iperó and the radio-chemical process laboratories at Ezeiza.

By the Declaration the two countries agreed to open their records systems to each other to ensure that their nuclear technology would be use solely for peaceful purposes.

In the operative paragraphs of the Declaration, Argentina and Brazil decided:

-To adopt the Joint Accounting and Control System agreed on by their Permanent Bilateral Committee on Nuclear Co-operation which is to apply to all the nuclear activities of the two countries;

-That the following activities were to be carried out within the following 45 days:

- An exchange of lists describing all their nuclear facilities,

- An exchange of inventories of nuclear material,

- A first reciprocal inspection of centralized records systems,

- The presentation to the IAEA of their records as part of the Joint Accounting and Control System, to bring it into conformity with those submitted to IAEA.

They also decided to enter into negotiations with IAEA with a view to the conclusion of a joint safeguards agreement based on the Joint Accounting and Control System.

After the conclusion of the safeguards agreement with IAEA, they would it was decided, take appropriate action to permit the full entry into force for the two countries of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, including action to update and improve its wording.□

Interview with Edith Ballantyne

Q: As the President of the Special NGO Committee on Disarmament at the UN Office at Geneva, what are the issues on which you are trying to focus attention?

A: We are planning a seminar on "Disarmament Viewed from the South" because a number of our members say that, although tension beween the Soviet Union and the USA has decreased, this has had no impact on developing countries, and that, on the contrary, there has been an increase in militarization, a certain dumping of military equipment, continued arms transfers, and too much money spent on weapons.

Q: What can be done about this?

A: My own personal view is that the way to stop arms transfers is to stop arms production. But the registration of arms transfers would help, for although we are all aware that some would continue under cover, a measure of accountability would be important. People in the developing countries will need to make demands to see how their money is spent, that the aid accepted be a kind that meets people's needs. After our seminar we will have a report, and would like to send it to a larger constituency worldwide.

Q: What other issues are you considering?

A: We have been examining the new technologies that relate to the need for strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention which has its third review conference in September. We co-sponsored a briefing for delegates and NGOs on confidence-building measures that would relate to that Convention.

Q: If you look at the basic question of arms control in the post-cold-war world, how do you see the issues?

A: Some people think that now that East-West negotiations are taking place, the problems are solved. But we cannot relax. For example, even though the START agreement provides for the dismantling of 30% of nuclear strategic weapons, there will remain more strategic nuclear weapons then existed at the time the START negotiations began. What is going to be done with the nuclear material retrieved from the weapons that are to be destroyed? Will it be buried? Will it go into nuclear power plants? Will it be put into new weapons, or what? Since there is already a major environmental and health problem from these weapons, we should at least stop producing more. When you think of the costs involved in producing weapons, and the additional costs of destroying them, the whole thing is obscene.

Q: What do you think can be done?

A: The public needs to be made aware that just because there is now a different relationship between the US and the USSR does not mean the problems of disarmament are resolved.

Q: What is your view of the various plans that address some of these questions?

A: I've been wanting to study the French Arms Control and Disarmament Plan that was put forward by President Mitterrand in June and presented to the Conference on Disarmament. The question is whether this sort of plan could receive broad support. On the other hand, I think it is too limited in its objectives; in introducing the plan France insisted on the need for a certain number of nuclear weapons. So long as you have a nuclear deterrence doctrine, and so long as you are going to continue to test to update your own nuclear weapons so as not to be overtaken by another nuclear power, the danger to the survival of life on our planet remains.

Q: What are the next steps to reduce these dangers?

A: It's true that you need to move forward step by step. I do think that this completely new relationship beween the Soviet Union and the United States is a good thing and opens new possibilities, but I think they are not being used. You need to have a lot of things coming together.

Q: What would be an example of that?

A: I think of the INF Treaty. There was a wide mobilization on the part of the public, a very large awareness including massive demonstrations so that political parties finally had to take account of these views and take a position for disarmament. I think that was one element. The other main element was clearly the change in the relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States. So I think a number of things have to come together, and one thing can push the other to reach a result.

Q: Were there other factors?

A:The developments in the Soviet Union which I think were largely economic were also important. Also Chernobyl and the related concern about the effect of radiation from testing on the people and on the environment, especially in Semipalatinsk. I think a lot of things happened and then finally came together to make the INF possible.

Q: What about the changes in Eastern Europe?

A delegation to the League of Nations in 1932 from the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom which is one of the oldest NGOs working for disarmament. Mrs. Ballantyne is the Secretary-General of WILPF.

A: There was a tremendous public outburst in the Eastern European countries for economic and socio/political changes. They had become possible because of a declared decision by the Soviet Union that they would not interfere in any Eastern European country that opted for internal changes.

Q: How does your view that several elements are needed for change relate to the role of NGOs in the field of disarmament?

A: Because a wide range of coordinated actions are needed for change, it is extremely important to have a broad common information base. That is why the NGO Committee on Disarmament and its organizations want to relate more to the World Disarmament Campaign. In a way we are coordinating our work all the time, but we have not been able to show that there is a worldwide effort for disarmament that is supported by many governments.

Q: How do the efforts to control the arms trade tie in with this global approach?

A: I think this is an issue that is uppermost in many people's minds because probably the Gulf war could never have happened had it not been for a lot of arms sales and sales of technology, not only to Iraq, but to the whole region.

Q: How would one stop that?

A: I don't know, but one can discuss the problem after the clear tragedy of the Gulf war. And there has been a reduction in military expenditures; and the needs are so great. Three quarters of the world is hungry, and we live in an environment that is deteriorating. And yet we continue to spend an incredible amount on arms production and the military establishment. This takes resources, finite resources, money, intelligence, and it ruins our environment. A lot of this brain power should be devoted to meeting some of the recognized human needs.

Q: So what can be done?

A: You cannot talk about disarmament in a vacuum. You need to also consider conflict resolution and one begins to realize more and more that in order to have security, it has to be comprehensive. It has to include disarmament, social development, economic development and improvement of the standard of living for all the people. Presumably there has to be growth, but this doesn't need to mean only more industrialization. There could be more labour intensive work, more inventiveness and the development of human abilities that everyone has if they are given an outlet. We need to set our minds and the minds of our scientists to the task of organizing this use of human resources.

Q: That brings us to the question of education. Now that the cold war between the super-Powers is ending, what do you think people need to learn to avoid new confrontation?

A: Some people from developing countries think that arms are acquired mainly for internal control although the governments tend to say it is for national security against one external threat or another.

Q: What should be done if that is the case?

A: More and more external threats are developing not from direct aggression but from the pressure of people fleeing across borders to get away from internal unrest, civil war or environmental disasters. Regional cooperation in all spheres would ensure better security for all than can the military.

Q: How do you relate this regional approach to a global approach to international security?

A: I think it important to recognize that we are all living in a small world, and that what happens in one corner affects others right around the globe. Thus our societies cannot afford to go to war to resolve their conflicts, but they must begin to sit together and try to find solutions. That may mean making concessions, but in the interest of the whole, which in the long run would benefit everyone. I think that is the only approach, and I can't think of any forum other than the UN where this is possible. I was very optimistic when President Gorbachev came out for a comprehensive system of international security and to give the UN the role for which it was created in the first place.

Q: Finally, what else do you look forward to in disarmament?

A: I would hope that there will be a return to genuine multilateral disarmament negotiations, especially in the Conference on Disarmament and that the convention banning chemical weapons will be concluded soon. □

Update on weapons inspections in Iraq

On 11 September, Ambassador Rolf Ekeus, Executive Chairman of the Special Commission set up under Security Council resolution 687 (1991) to inspect and dispose of Iraqi mass destruction armaments, briefed correspondents.

Nuclear capabilities

In reporting on the progress made by the Commission in its activities, Ambassador Ekeus reviewed its findings that relate to nuclear weapons. In the last four months joint IAEA/Special Commission inspections had identified a electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS) uranium enrichment programme. The inspectors had found a pilot programme that was almost ready for industrial-scale production. They had also been able to find twin plants relating to a centrifuge programme also designed for the purpose of enriching uranium. On the basis of the evidence observed, "it was impossible to draw any other conclusion than that this production was intended for non-peaceful purposes", Ambassador Ekeus stated.

Biological Weapons capabilities

Ambassador Ekeus stated that although Iraq had declared that it had no biological weapons or material for such weapons, the first inspection had found that Iraq had a research programme for non-civilian purposes which included the ability to contaminate food, drink and water, and to develop biological weapons agents. It was also found that Iraq had a capability to produce biological weapons on a limited scale. However no biological weapons had been found. A team was scheduled to go to Iraq in mid September to obtain a fuller understanding of Iraqi capabilities.



Iraqi bulldozer destroying missile fire-control systems.

Chemical weapons capabilities

In the field of chemical weapons, Ambassador Ekeus said it was already known that there was a large quantity of munitions: some 46,000 filled munitions, and an even greater number of unfilled munitions. The major task regarding these weapons was to destroy them. Activities had begun and 8,100 pieces of unfilled munition had been destroyed. Iraq was cooperating in this work, he said.

The destruction of CW warheads was taking place in Iraq. At the time of the briefing, the Commission was in the process of transporting the CW warheads for 30 missiles to the Muthanna site for destruction, plus a number of artillery pieces, 6,400 projectiles filled with mustard gas, and also some bombs filled with mustard gas. The Commission had discovered 4,600 containers for nerve gas which had not been declared by Iraq. It is expected that the work of CW destruction at Muthanna will take several months to complete.

Missile identification and destruction

There had been four inspections in this area and eight repair and production facilities had been inspected as well as ten declared sites and nine undeclared sites. Following the early inspections, 460 major items had been destroyed, including 62 ballistic missiles (53 Scuds and 9 Al Hussains).

The Chairman of the Special Commission did not feel that all the missiles in Iraq had been found; for example, according to Iraq's own information, they had had more than 800 Scud missiles. The Commission had destroyed 53 of them. Although a great number had been used in

Chemical weapon aerial bombs under UN snspection in Iraq.

the Iran/Iraq war as well as in the Gulf conflict and some might have been destroyed by the coalition bombing, the arithmetic nevertheless did not seem to add up. More inspections would have to be carried out in this area.

Helicopters

Discussing the fact that Iraqi authorities had refused to allow Commission teams to fly its own helicopters in Iraq, the Chairman of the Special Commission observed that Iraq was obliged to honour the terms of Security Council resolution 707. It states that Iraq must "allow the Special Commission, the IAEA and their Inspection Teams to conduct both fixed wing and helicopter flights throughout Iraq for all relevant purposes including inspection, surveillance, aerial surveys, transportation and logistics without interference of any kind and upon such terms and conditions as may be determined by the Special Commission, and to make full use of their own aircraft and such airfields in Iraq as they may determine are most appropriate for the work of the Commission".

Iraq had offered its helicopters to the UN Special Commission. Nonetheless Ambassador Ekeus said the Commission needed its own helicopters to be able to quickly carry teams of inspectors and their equipment to more distant sites and to guarantee their ability to quickly evacuate team members in case of accidents.

Referring to incidents of equipment being removed from sites about to be inspected, he stated that it was necessary to have independent helicopters for short-notice or no-notice inspections, which were essential when dealing with highly mobile material. The German Government had provided the United Nations with three Sikorsky helicopters, together with full crews.

On the general question of cooperation, Ambassador Ekeus said that on the technical level, with regard to declared materials, there was good cooperation. The Iraqi officers were knowledgeable and took pride in the technology attained by Iraq. At the same time there was no willingness to disclose or explain the general thinking behind the development of the different weapons systems. It was possible to see many facts, the Ambassador stated, but "I take it that there was an idea behind these facts, and we have not been given any explanation what that idea was, and until we understand the total scope of what was being done, we cannot rest".□

NGO news items

The brief report below on activities of non-governmental organizations includes some of the events and programmes of an international character which have come to the attention of the United Nations Department for Disarmament affairs. The coverage does not imply any judgement by the United Nations.

The CGT (La Confédération Générale de Travail) Metalworkers' and State Employees' Federations of France, which includes workers in the arms industry, initiated an international meeting of trade unionists from the arms industry from 10-11 June in Paris. There was broad participation from trade unionists from arms factories and from university specialists from all parts of Europe, North America and Japan. There were two days of wide-ranging debate on disarmament, diversification and development. **Contact:** World Federation of Trade Unions, Branická 112, 140 00 Prague 4, Czechoslovakia. (Fax: 235 43 93)

The **Centre for Days of Peace** will be host to a Conference on Humanitarian Cease-fires from 24-27 November in Ottawa, Canada. A major focus of the conference will concern the impact of war on children, and studies will be reported on the effect of previous cease fires. The keynote speech will be given by the Executive Director of UNICEF, Mr. James Grant. Participants will include people from countries with recent and ongoing conflicts in South and South-East Asia, and in the Horn of Africa and the Middle East. **Contact**: Christine Peringer, Committee for Days of Peace, 170 A Booth Street, Ottawa, Ontario K1r 7J4, Canada. (Telephone: 613 233 8621, Fax: 613 233 9028.)

The World Federalist Association and eight other principal co-sponsors will convene "The Second Global Structures Convocation: Environment and Development" from 6-9 February 1992 at the J.W. Marriott Hotel in Washington D.C. Its purpose is to promote broad-based support for the development and empowerment of those international laws and institutions needed to implement the findings of the Earth Summit – the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) – scheduled for June 1992 in Brazil, and for the future needs of sustainable development in the world, and to generate support for the international insititutions, laws and systems needed to assure a mutually safe, just, and viable global community. In addition to WFA which is the managing sponsor, the other principal co-sponsors are, The Alliance for Our Common Future, The American Association of University Women, The Global Tomorrow Coalition, the International Development Conference, the League of Women Voters of the United States, The National Audubon Society, United Nations Association of the USA, and The US Citizens Network on UNCED. Additional Co-Sponsors include the National Peace Institute Foundation, Sane Freeze, the Society for International Development and the WorldWatch Institue. **Contact:** The Second Global Structures Convocation, 1000 16th Street, N.W. Suite 810, Washington, DC 20036. (Tel: 1 202 833 9585, Fax: 1 202 785 3942)

The **First Soviet-Greek Seminar on the Problems of the Mediterranean, Naval Disarmament and Maritime Ecology** took place in Moscow from 2-7 July 1991. The 14 delegates from Greece included a retired Rear Admiral and the Mayor of Piraeus; the 60-person Soviet delegation included the President of the Soviet Maritime Law Association, the General Inspector of the USSR Ministry of Defence and several admirals and professors. A United States retired Rear Admiral from the Centre for Defense Information and the Enterprise Development Associates also participated. Topics addressed included problems of the Mediterranean, maritime ecology, naval disarmament and prospects for an International Centre for Naval Disarmament and Maritime Ecology which participants unanimously supported, proposing that it should have its headquarters in Piraeus. **Contact:** General P. Barabolya, Soviet Peace to the Oceans Committee, 36, pr. Mira, Moscow, USSR, 129010. (Tel: 280 71 12, Fax: 288 95 87, Telex: 411426 Mir SU.)

The **United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs and the Department of Public Information** have issued a poster to be available in October. The poster is divided vertically by two yellow lines in the middle, separating images of death and destruction and of life and growth, with the words at the top of the poster, "We Have A Choice" and, at the bottom, "United Nations – For Disarmament". The poster is available in English and French at all United Nations Information Centres. **Contact:** The UNIC in your country or region, or the United Nations Bookshop at UN Headquarters in New York.